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Abstract
This article considers a model of spatial competition where firms and consumers are located
in a semicircular space rather than in the whole circle (Salop’s model) or the linear city
(Hotelling’s model), under the assumptions of both, convex and concave, transportation
costs. The paper tries to generalize the results of the two previous models. We find that for
concave transportation costs the existence of a price equilibrium is warranted for every firms’
location when the length of the semicircular space is greater than 3/4. For the convex case,
perfect equilibrium is only obtained when the size of the market segment is equivalent to
Hotelling's linear model.
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1.-Introduction 
When studying spatial competition, two standard models have been considered 
in the literature, the linear model, first studied by Hotelling (1929), and the circular 
model as popularized by Salop’s (1979).  
The linear model is usually used when the problem under consideration is such 
that locations of firms is a priori heterogeneous, however, market boundaries do lead in 
certain situations to existence problems that do not appear in the circular model for the 
same type of assumptions
1. On the other hand, the circular model is preferred when 
firms’  locations  can  be  considered  homogeneous.  It  is  used  to  study  some  market 
configurations  such  as  locations  of  stores  a  long  a  city  belt  way,  airlines  choosing 
departure times on the dial of a clock, etc. However, in these types of circular market 
configurations, there are situations in which the market is discontinuous.  
Many environmental policies involve the introduction of restrictions on market 
configuration by the  regulating authorities.  For  example, in most urban designs,  we 
observe the existence of portions of land located around the city belt-ways devoted to 
non-residential  purposes.  We  can  find  environmentally  protected  areas,  parks, 
recreational facilities, etc. When considering urban design, regulators have to decide 
whether  they  should  leave  some  part  of  urban  land  for  this  type  of  recreational 
activities, and if they do so, what is the optimal size of these non-residential areas. 
Similarly, in order to control for noise pollution, many airports located near cities have 
introduced limits on take offs and landings during certain hours of the night, therefore, 
imposing time restrictions on the services offered by airlines.These physical or time 
zones represent a discontinuity in the market since neither consumers nor firms can be 
located within them; however, it is possible to find consumers and firms adjacent to 
both ends of these restricted areas.  
In  order  to  study  the  implications  of  this  type  of  market  configurations,  we 
assume a circular spatial model, where there is a segment where people live and firms 
locate,  that  we  shall  refer  to  as  the  market,  and  another  segment  where  no  market 
activity takes place. In this context, a three-stage game can be considered in which in 
the first stage the regulator chooses the size of the market, in the second stage firms 
choose locations and in the third stage firms compete in prices. We will suppose that the 
regulator chooses the length of the market in a non-strategic manner
2; therefore, the 
model we present, once market size is given, can be reduced to a two-stage game in 
which firms first choose location, and then compete in prices. 
This model can be thought of as a synthesis of the circular and linear spatial 
models.  If  the  size  of  the  market  is  half  of  the  circumference,  l/2,  the  model  is 
equivalent to Hotelling’s (1929) linear city, while if the size of the market is the whole 
circle, l, we are in Salop’s (1979) configuration. We analyze the existence of a price 
equilibrium when the market segment, h, is restricted to be less than l. (See figure 1) 
We will make the standard assumptions of two firms selling a homogeneous 
product, consumers evenly distributed a long the market segment, and we will study the 
existence problem in our model, using a concave function that ensures the existence of a 
perfect equilibrium in pure strategies in the circular model (see De Frutos et al, 1999).  
We find that there exists a subgame perfect price equilibrium for any location of 
firms provided the length of the market is greater than approximately 4
3 . Furthermore, 
this equilibrium is unique and implies firms locating opposite to each other. If h is 
                                                
1 For example, when 3 firms are considered, or when the transportation costs considered is concave. 
2 In the sense that the regulator does not optimize an objective function to choose market size. 2
smaller than 4
3 , we find that, for certain values of h and firms locations, there is a strip 
where no price equilibrium may exist. Nevertheless, there are many combinations of 
market  sizes  and  firm  locations  for  which  equilibrium  can  be  obtained.  When  we 
compare  the  intensity  of  competition,  given  the  size  of  the  market,  we  find  that 
competition is more intense for low values of h, and the equilibrium region is smaller. 
We also study the model under convex transportation costs and we find that 
perfect  equilibrium  can  only  be  obtained  for  values  of  h  for  which  our  model  is 
equivalent to Hotelling’s linear city. 
The paper is organized as follows, in section 2 we present the model, in section 3 
we study the existence of equilibrium, section 4 contains the conclusions, and finally 
major proofs and graphs can be found in the appendix. 
2.- The Model 
We  consider  a  circular  city  of  length  l  where  the  regulator  chooses  the  size  of  the 
market, h, so that firms and consumers can only be located on a certain segment of the 
circle  . l h £  There are two firms selling a homogeneous product, with zero production 
costs, located at x and y, with h y x £ £ £ 0 . 
Consumers are evenly distributed along h, and each consumer buys a single unit 
of  this  product  per  unit  of  time,  irrespective  of  its  price.  Since  the  product  is 
homogeneous, consumers will buy from the firm who offers the least delivered price, 
that is, the mill price plus transportation costs.  Let p1, p2, denote the mill prices charged 
by firms located at x and y, respectively. The distance between consumer z and firm i is 
given by i z di - = ,  y x i , = . We will consider a concave transportation costs function 
from  the  linear  quadratic  family:  C(di)  =  k(di-di
2)  that  have  been  shown  to  ensure 
existence of a perfect equilibrium in pure strategies in the circular model. Although 
firms  and  consumers  can  only  be  located  within  h,  consumers  can  travel  along  the 
whole circle and they will always take the direction that implies the shorter distance to 
the chosen firm.  
The model described above, given that the regulator behaves in a non-strategic 
manner, does give rise to a two-stage game in which firms first decide simultaneously 
their location and then simultaneously choose prices. It turns out that the solution to this 
game depends critically on the length of the market segment, h. In order to determine 
the market boundaries and derive the demands faced by each firm, we will have to find 
the indifferent consumers. A consumer is indifferent to buying from one firm or the 
other if and only if:  ) ( ) ( 2 2 1 1 d C p d C p + = + . 
To analyze the problem, we will assume, without loss of generality that in the 
expression of the transportation costs functions  k = 1, and the total length of the circle, 
l, is equal to1. When the market length considered is the whole circle (See figure 1), 
three  types  of  possible  indifferent  consumers  are  found,  each  one  belonging  to  a 
different segment of the circumference given by:  Î 1 m [x, y],  Î 2 m [y, 1], and  Î 3 m [0, 
x].  
Taking into account that the market is equal to h (h < 1), and depending on the 
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3.- Equilibrium 
Given the size of the market, h, and using the usual approach for a two-stage 
non-cooperative  game  in  which  firms  select  a  position  at  the  first  stage  and 
subsequently set their prices, we study the subgame perfect equilibrium. We recall that a 
perfect price-location equilibrium is defined as a pair( )
N N x p , 1 , ( )
N N y p , 2  such that:  
( ) h y x p p i
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Where  ) , ( 2 1
N N p p is a Nash equilibrium in the price subgame when the locations choice 
is fixed. 
The profit function for firm i is given by Bi = pi Di,  i =1,2. It can be easily observed that 
this profit function is not concave in prices (see the expression for the demand function 
above) and it may exhibit different configurations. In particular, it could exhibit several 
local  maxima.  Therefore,  the  sufficient  condition  for  a  price  equilibrium  for  any 
possible location of firms is not satisfied, although depending on the values of z, q and 
h, we could find combinations of market sizes and firms locations for which equilibrium 
may be obtained.  In order to explore this possibility we will reduce the number of 
parameters to two by assuming that: x = 0 and  2 / 1 0 £ £ y .  In this case, we only have 
two indifferent consumers  Î 1 m [x, y],  Î 2 m [y, 1] while  Î 3 m [0, x], disappears since x = 
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We will now compute the equilibrium of the price subgame.  4


































1 2 1 1
1
0
2 ) 1 ( 2
2
) 1 2 (
) 1 ( 2
I p p for










I p p for hp
B
The  profit  function  is  not  concave  in  prices  and  it  could  exhibit  different 
configurations. In particular, it may exhibit one or two local maxima. Depending on the 
values of y two cases may arise, one in which the global optimum belongs to region
1
2 I , 
and another in which the global optimum belongs to
1
3 I . 
3.1.- Equilibrium in Region 
1
2 I
For  this  prices  interval  two  indifferent  consumers  exist.Computing  the  first  order 
conditions for the profit functions in
1
2 I , we obtain: 
) 1 4 )( 1 (
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Proof: See Appendix 
Proposition 2:  There exists a subgame perfect price-location equilibrium if and only if 
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Proof: See Apendix. 
3.2.- Equilibrium in Region 
1
3 I
For this prices interval only one indifferent consumer exists.Computing the first order 
conditions for the profit functions in
1
3 I , we obtain: 
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Proof: See Appendix. 
Corollary: if  733 , 0 < h , there is no price equilibrium in region R defined by: 
{ } ) ( ) ( / ) , ( 21 12 y h h y h y h R < < =
Proof:  R  is  the  intersection  of  the  two  complements  of  regions 1 R and 2 R .  Figure  6 
combines the two equilibrium regions depicted in the previous two figures. As can be 
seen from the graph, there is only a narrow strip where no equilibrium exists.□
In figure 4, the equilibrium area for region 
1
2 I is depicted, all points in the shaded 
area are possible equilibria. Note that for  733 , 0 ³ h there exists a price equilibrium for 
every possible location of firm 2. When we look at the optimal location of firm 2 in 
region
1
2 I , when there are two indifferent consumers, we find that firm 2 benefits from 
moving away from firm 1 and locating at the opposite boundary of the market segment 
where  m1  exists.  The  result  is  equivalent  to  what  we  obtain  when  we  consider  the 
complete circular model: there are two indifferent consumers and firms locate opposite 
to each other and equidistant to the two indifferent consumers. However, in our model 
the competitive situation of the two firms is not the same, since we have had to fix the 
location of firm 1 in order to reduce the number of parameters. Firm 1 is located at the 
edge  of  the  non-residential  area,  and  therefore  this  side  of  its  potential  market  is 
restricted, as a result, firm 2 may charge a larger price and obtain larger profits than firm 
1. 
Figure 5 shows the equilibrium area for region
1
3 I . All points belonging to the 
shaded area (above the line h = y), are equilibrium candidates. 
When  we  look  at  the  optimal  location  of  firm  2  in  this  region,  we  find 
that 0 ) 4 (
9






and therefore, firm 2 will tend to move away from firm 1. In 
region
1
3 I  there is only one indifferent consumer and the market resembles the linear city 
case, given that firm 1 is fixed at 0, firm 2 will choose to locate at the other market 
extreme. 
If we look at the prices differences of the two equilibrium regions we obtain: 
0
3
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We can see that, in both cases, the price of firm 1 is smaller than that of firm 2, this can 
be explained, as mentioned above, in terms of market configuration since firm 2 has 
more potential customers than firm 1.   
Also, when we compare the prices differences in both regions, D
N1 and D
N2, we 
find that:  0
3
) 2 ) 1 ( )( 1 ( 2 2 1 >
+ - - -
= -
y y h y y
D D
N N  for all  ) , ( y h , so 
2 1 N N D D > . This 
implies that the intensity of competition is stronger in the second case than in the first 6
one. This is not surprising since market size is smaller in the second case than in the 
first and this must induce stronger competition. This can explain why the equilibrium 
region of the second case is smaller than the first one. 
Convex Transportation Costs 
We have also studied the convex transportation costs function: C(d) = kd
2. This 
function was shown to be strategically equivalent to C(di) = k(di-di
2) when the whole 
circle is being considered (see De Frutos et al, 1999, 2001). However, when the market 
is restricted to be a semicircle this result breaks down. We find that the structure of the 
demand function varies substantially from the concave to the convex case, as we will 
expose now: 
Let C(di) = kdi
2 and that l = k = 1, x < y. In this case, and for the whole circular 
market  three  types  of  indifferent  consumers  may  be  obtained: [ ] 2
1





2 , + + Î y x n   and  [ ] 1 , 2
1
3 + Î y n .  However,  when  we  restrict  the  length  of  the 
market to h, we obtain the following cases: 
Case 1:  [ ] 2
1 , + Î x y h . Then the indifferent consumers n2, n3 do not belong to the 
market, therefore there is only one indifferent consumer, n1. In this case we have a 
perfect equilibrium. This result is equivalent to Hotelling’s linear model with quadratic 
transportation  costs,  as  studied  by  D’  Aspremont  et  al.  (1979);  where  firms  choose 
maximum differentiation.  
Case 2: [ ] 2
1
2
1 , + + Î y x h . Then there exist two possible indifferent consumers n1 and n2
and the demand function is piecewise linear with four different domains ([1] the whole 
market is for firm1,[2] market boundaries are determined by the indifferent consumers  
n1 and n2, [3] market boundaries are determined by only one indifferent consumer,  n1 or 
n2. [4] the whole market is for firm 2). In this case, there is no price equilibrium for 
every possible firms’ locations and every value of h. 
Case 3: [ ] 1 , 2
1 + Î y h . Then either two indifferent consumers will exist simultaneously n1
and n2 or n2 and n3, or just n2 and the demand function is piecewise linear with five 
different  domains  ([1]  the  whole  market  is  for  firm1,[2]  market  boundaries  are 
determined  by  the  indifferent  consumers    n1  and  n2,  [3]  market  boundaries  are 
determined by only one indifferent consumer,  n2. [4] market boundaries are determined 
by the indifferent consumers  n2and n3, [5]the whole market is for firm 2). As in case 2, 
there is no perfect equilibrium.  
4.- Conclusions 
In this article we propose a circular model of spatial competition in which the 
market  is  restricted  in  order  to  allow  for  a  non-residential  area.  Aside  from  this 
discontinuity  in  the  market,  we  make  standard  assumptions  and  use  the  two  linear 
quadratic functions (concave and convex cases) that have been proven to ensure the 
existence of price equilibrium in the circular model. 
We find that, unlike when the whole circle is considered, this two transportation 
costs functions are not strategically equivalent. When concave transportation costs are 
assumed, we obtain that provided the regulator chooses the size of the market segment 
to  be  greater  than  approximately 4
3   ), 733 , 0 ( ³ h there  is  a  subgame  perfect  price-
location equilibrium and this equilibrium is unique. On the other hand, if market size is 7
chosen to be less than 4
3 , for certain values of h and firms locations, there is a narrow 
strip where no price equilibrium may exist. As usual, equilibrium failure is due to the 
non-concavities exhibited by profit functions. 
When convex transportation costs are assumed, perfect equilibrium can only be 
obtained for  [ ] 2
1 , + Î x y h . This case is equivalent to Hotellings’ linear model.8
5.-Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: 
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N N p p could be a Nash price equilibrium if y and h belong to the set: 
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In order to verify condition (ii) we have to check, for 
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N N p p is  a  Nash  price 
equilibrium for 11 h h ³  and  12 h h ³ . 9





N N p p is a Nash 
price equilibrium in the region 1 R defined as: 
{ } 12 1 ) , ( h h y h R ³ =    (See figure 4) 
Proof of Proposition 2: 
From  proposition  1,  there  exists  a  price  equilibrium  if ) ( 12 y h h ³ ,  however,  simple 
calculations show that  ) ( 12 y h is increasing ( 0
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there exist a price equilibrium for any firms location.
If we look at the optimal location of firm 2 (given that the location of firm 1 is 
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Proof of Proposition 3: 
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N N p p is a Nash price equilibrium in region 2 R  defined as: 
{ } 21 2 ) , ( h h y y h R £ £ = (See figure 5) 11
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